Startseite // SnT // Distinguishe... // Can we protect protocols against attacks that have not been invented yet? - April 11, 2013

Can we protect protocols against attacks that have not been invented yet? - April 11, 2013

It is our pleasure to host this distinguished lecture by Prof. David Naccache, Pantheon-Assas University. The lecture will be followed by a reception. Please feel free to forward this invitation.

Date: April 11, 2013
Time: 16:30
Venue: Weicker Building -Room B001 Ground floor, 4 rue Alphonse Weicker, L-2721 Luxembourg

Abstract: Imagine that by some sort of witchcraft all your ciphertexts turn into plaintexts. You have no idea what is going on. The problem may be leaky hardware, a rootkit that controls your OS, key theft by a spies, a subtle cryptographic weakness in your algorithm or any sort of currently unknown security failure. Your system, used by millions of individuals over the Internet cannot be shut-down while the problem is being fixed. Can your protocols be designed in advance to control damage under such adverse conditions? In this invited talk we will see how a number of practical protocols can be reengineered to decrease damage in the case of cryptographic failure. As an example, we will show how re-engineering non-cryptographic software such as rsynch allows better withstanding such “mystery attacks”.

David Naccache is a cryptographer, currently a professor at Pantheon-Assas University and member of the École normale supérieure's Computer Laboratory. He received his Ph.D. in 1995 from the École nationale supérieure des télécommunications. Naccache's most notable work is in public-key cryptography, including the cryptanalysis of digital signature schemes. Together with Jacques Stern he designed the similarly named but very distinct Naccache-Stern cryptosystem and Naccache-Stern knapsack cryptosystem.